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Abstract 
Governmental activities in welfare states influence private charitable giving predominantly in 
two ways: (1) government spending on the provision of public goods may cause crowding out 
of private charitable contributions; and (2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. 
For a rich sample of German income tax returns, we estimate elasticities of charitable giving 
regarding tax incentives, income and governmental spending. Using censored quantile 
regression, we are able to derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of 
charitable giving. Assuming a world with impure altruism (Andreoni 1990), we find evidence 
for impurely altruistic giving behaviour. Taking crowding out into account, tax deductibility 
of charitable giving suffices to foster private giving to offset foregone tax revenues.  
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In numerous economies, the provision of public goods like education, research, and culture 
relies on private contributions as well as on government spending. Thus, in order to encourage 
private funding, donations benefit from a favorable tax treatment in many countries. In 
addition, public-private co-funding of public goods might counteract these efforts as 
government spending addresses the issue of crowding out private contributions. Against this 
background, assessing the overall efficiency of tax treatment is therefore of critical interest to 
public policy. On that account, the last decades have seen a lively interest in the analysis of 
charitable giving among tax policy makers and researchers.  
The scale to which tax incentives are suitable to boost donation depends whether they are 
price elastic and to what extent. Hence, estimating price and income elasticities of giving are 
useful to evaluate the effectiveness of tax reliefs and if they are eligible to offset forgone tax 
revenues, which could have been used to provide public goods directly (Feldstein 1980). 
Empirical evidence on this matter is not conclusive. Following Taussig’s (1967) seminal 
study analysing US tax return data, numerous approaches were conducted. The review of 69 
studies covering five decades Peloza and Steel (2005) led to ambiguous findings on price 
elasticity of giving  due to heterogeneous data sources, the statistical methods applied and 
different periods under observation. In sum, their meta-analysis supports the hypothesis that 
tax deductions for charitable giving are treasury efficient. However, more recent studies have 
provided a different picture. Based on panel data, they find that previous studies might have 
overestimated price elasticity (Bakija and Heim forthcoming) or even that giving behaviour 
qualifies as price inelastic (Fack and Landais 2010). 
The crowding out of private funding for a public good due to public spending is a well-
developed field (e.g. Abrams and Schmitz 1978, Nyborg and Rege 2003). Theoretical 
framework provided by Samuelson (1954) with rational agents shows an under-provision of 
the public good. Moreover, the share of people contributing to the public good is decreasing 
in the number of agents, while government spending will completely crowd out private 
contributions. However, introducing the possibility to allow individuals to derive utility from 
the act of giving per se, leads to the impure altruism model of Andreoni (1990) and in this 
setting, government spending not necessarily results in a complete crowding out. In addition, 
incomplete crowding out also occurs in case of fiscal illusion or an endorsement effect (Eckel 
et al. 2005). The setting of incomplete crowding out is supported by empirical findings. 
Findings cover a wide range from 28 per cent (Abrams and Schmitz 1984) to 71 per cent 
(Andreoni 1993), whereas experiments show that (depending on the chosen set up) complete 
crowding out is possible (Eckel et al. 2005). Looking into the motives of giving, Crumpler 
and Grossman (2008) find that warm glow giving exists and that its magnitude is significant.  
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Overall, empirical research on giving behaviour has produced ambivalent results depending 
on the year and source of underlying data and econometric methods. The current study 
provides new empirical evidence on three key aspects of assessing whether this treatment of 
donations is efficient: estimates for income elasticities, price elasticities, and crowding out of 
private charitable contributions are provided for Germany. Deploying a rich sample of income 
tax return data for 1998, 2001 and 2004, we follow Fack and Landais (2010) in applying a 
non-parametric estimation technique of quantile regression to derive estimates at different 
points of the conditional distribution of charitable giving. In short, our approach is not 
restricted to answering whether current tax incentives are eligible to foster charitable giving 
but also aims at determining for whom tax incentives matter most. Therefore, the current 
study complements former research in two ways. First, the estimation technique helped us to 
establish estimates on income and price elasticities derived for the German case. Second, for 
the first time crowding out is introduced in this kind of econometric setting. The remainder of 
the article is organised as follows: in Section 2, the conceptual framework is discussed 
shortly. Section 3 describes the data and its preparation. Section 4 presents the main results 
for almost three million tax units. Section 5 concludes by reviewing key findings. 
 
2 Conceptual framework 
2.1 Impure altruism, crowding out and efficient design of tax incentives  
The optimal theoretical design of tax incentives to encourage charitable giving depends on the 
modelling of philanthropy. As empirical evidence dissents the hypothesis of pure altruism 
regarding donations to charity, we start out assuming a world according to Andreoni’s (1990) 
impure altruism model to define our efficient benchmark. In this world, individuals may not 
only derive utility from a public good ܩ but also from the individual’s contribution to the 
public good ݃௜. Three cases of altruistic behaviour can be distinguished: (1) Individuals are 
pure altruists and do not care for their individual contribution and ݃௜ does not enter utility. (2) 
Individuals are only driven by warm-glow. Consequently, ܩ is not part of individual utility. 
(3) Individuals derive utility from ܩ and ݃௜ and are considered impure altruists. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives in a theoretical framework with crowding out 
and warm glow, we turn to Saez (2004). In this framework the effectiveness of tax incentives 
can be easily evaluated. Assuming gross incomeݕ௜ to be derived from wealth ݓ௜ and earnings 
݁௜, where the latter enters the utility function negatively to reflect that labor supply is costly. 
In this framework, individuals maximise  
 
 maxݑ௜ ൌ ݑሺܿ௜, ݃௜, ݁௜, ܩሻ (1) 
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subject to the constraint  
 
 ܿ௜ ൅ ݃௜݌௜ ൑ ݕ௜ െ ܶሺݔ௜ሻ ൅ ܴ (2) 
   
Governmental activity is expressed by individual (proportional) taxes ܶሺݔ௜ሻ, tax price of 
giving ݌௜ and a lump sum payment ܴ. The tax price of giving mirrors the tax incentives. In the 
German case, the tax price of giving is 1 െ డ்ሺ௫೔ሻడ௫೔  where ݔ௜ denotes the tax unit’s taxable 
income. In absence of any further deductions but donations, taxable income is defined as 
ݔ௜ ൌ ݕ௜ െ ݃௜. Furthermore, let the public good be co-financed by government spending ܩ௚௢௩ 
and private donations ܩ௣௥௩ ൌ ∑݃௜ such that 
 
 ܩ ൌ ܩ௚௢௩ ൅ ܩ௣௥௩ (3) 
 
We assume that the number of individuals is sufficiently large and ܩ is fixed from an 
individual perspective. Hence, the individual private contribution is a function ݃௜ ൌ
݃ሺݕ௜ െ ܶሺݔ௜ሻ, ݌௜, ܴ, ܩ௚௢௩ሻ. For a given set of tax parameters, the crowding out of private 
contribution due to an increase in ܩ௚௢௩ is డ௚೔డீ೒೚ೡ	 ൑ 0. If 
డ௚೔
డீ೒೚ೡ	 ൐ െ1, crowding out is 
incomplete. Next to impure altruism, other reasons like fiscal illusion or the endorsement 
effect (Eckel et al. 2005) may induce incomplete crowding out. Fiscal illusion means that 
contributors are not aware of governmental welfare spending, resulting in a partial to zero 
crowding out effect, whereas an endorsement effect describes that individuals give (more) to 
charity because they are unaware of governmental transfers to the specific charity 
organisation. Furthermore, ݃௜ is considered to be a normal good with డ௚೔డ௬೔ ൐ 0 and 
డ௚೔
డ௣೔ ൏ 0. 
Saez makes three assumptions in order to derive a convincing rule for assessing the tax 
treatment of charitable giving. (1) Increasing the lump sum payment ܴ does not affect 
individual labour supply and thus has no income effect. (2) Aggregate earnings are not 
affected by the level of ܩ and the tax rate on contributions. (3) While holding utility constant, 
compensated supply of contributions is not affected by the tax rate on earnings. 
 Under the assumptions (1)-(3), the optimal tax treatment of individual charitable giving is 











In absence of crowding out, the rule for assessing the effectiveness of tax incentives 
simplifies and corresponds to Feldstein’s (1975) approach of ‘treasury efficiency’, indicating 
that the tax-defined price elasticity greater than one (in absolute value) offsets each dollar of 
tax revenue forgone and adds more than one dollar to the total spending.  
If ߟ௜௣ is below one, tax incentives are not eligible to offsets forgone tax revenues. The rule 
derived in this framework allows the determination for each individual whether tax incentives 
should be increased or decreased. If tax policy makers were be able to query the individual tax 
price elasticities of giving, optimal tax incentives could be identified for each individual. 
However, this assumption is not realistic. If private charitable contributions are crowded out 
by governmental expenditures ( డ௚೔డீ೒೚ೡ	 ൏ 0), the rule for optimal tax incentives will relax. In 
presence of crowding out, tax incentives are treasury efficient if ߟ௜௣is lower than one in 
absolute value. Considering crowding out, it is important to determine the impact of public 
expenditures on individual giving behaviour. According to Abrams and Schmitz (1978), 
government expenditure absorbs private action of individuals and relieves them from their 
social responsibility of contributing. Moreover, governmental transfers based on tax revenues 
lower the taxpayers’ disposable incomes and thus their willingness to contribute. To capture 
the influence of governmental social transfers on charitable giving, we construct ܩ௚௢௩ 
encompassing information on governmental spending for different cultural and social 
purposes.1 
 
2.2 Econometric methodology 
Modelling charitable giving requires taking different econometric problems into account (e.g. 
heavy left-censoring and heterogeneity). They have important implications for determining 
the correct estimation strategy. Since a high fraction of tax units does not donate at all, tax 
return data contains corner solution responses for a nontrivial fraction of observations. In 
contrast to previous studies, we do not exclude censored observations from our samples. 
According to Randolph (1995), excluding censored data raises the issue of endogenous 
selection. Non-giving tax units can be easily included in our model by assigning a fictitious 
gift to all taxpayers who report no giving. Boskin and Feldstein (1977) discuss adjustments of 
charitable giving for econometric purposes. In order to obtain a tax price of giving for non-
itemisers, they propose an assignment of 1 unit (1 € in prices of 2004).2 This marginal data 
modification is reasonable since estimated price and income elasticities refer to marginal 
changes. 
                                                 
1 See Section 3 for further details. 
2 The amount chosen is arbitrary. However, in a log specification 10 units will severely distort estimated giving 
behaviour. An addition of 1 units leads to a quite steep logarithmic transformation and yields high tax price 
elasticity for taxpayers who report no giving.  
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According to Feldstein and Lindsey (1981) and Fack and Landaise (2010), we allow price and 
income elasticities to depend on the amount given to charity. Therefore, modelling giving 
behaviour as homogeneous among tax units is too restrictive. We adopt a loose econometric 
specification, which allows for heterogeneous behavioural responses and covariates to 
influence the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.3 
Quantile regression was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). It is a non-parametric 
estimation technique. Quantile regression allows for covariates to shift location, scale and 
shape of the distribution of the dependent variable. Moreover, the assumption of the 
unobservable error term to be normally distributed with ߝ~ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ ൌ 0 is not needed, but 
only the much lesser constraint of being white noise with 	ܧሾߝሿ ൌ 0. It is assumed that the 
conditional quantile functions vary in the underlying quantile of the dependent variable. The 
ߠ-th quantile of the distribution of the dependent variable is a linear function of covariates X 
and can be expressed as: 
 
 ܳ௚|Xሺߠሻ ൌ X௜ᇱߚሺߠሻ (5) 
 
X࢏ᇱ is a matrix and includes continuous explanatory variables such as price, ݌௜, adjusted gross 
income,ݕ௜, and government funding, ܩ௚௢௩. Both the dependent variable donations (݃௜) and the 
explanatory variables are expressed as logs. Therefore, the estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. To control for socio-demographic variables, we include dummy 
variables for age, children, church membership, employment status and marriage. To control 
for differences in giving behaviour between the years, we include dummy variables indicating 
observations from 1998, 2001 and 2004. Table 1 gives an overview how variables included in 
our econometric equation are coded. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
According to Koenker and Hallock (2001), sample regression quantiles are defined as the 
solution to:  
 
 






                                                 
3 An alternative approach focuses on log-log specification and assumes homogeneous giving behaviour (e.g. 
Feldstein and Taylor 1976). However, if ex-ante determination of homogenous of giving behaviour is required, it 
does not allow for varying price and income elasticities.  
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Different quantile functions are estimated by minimising an asymmetrically weighted sum of 
absolute errors where ߩఏ is the tilted absolute value function. For ߠ  = 0.5 the quantile 
regression estimator minimises the sum of absolute values of error. Censored data can be 
easily taken into account within this framework. Because of censoring, our dependent variable 
ig  is only partially observable. It is assumed that the latent variable  
 
 ݃௜∗ ൌ ߱௜ᇱߚ ൅ ߝ௜ (7) 
 
is only observable for values above the censoring point ݃଴ with ݃௜ ൌ ݃௜∗ if ݃௜∗ ൐ ݃଴ and 
݃௜ ൌ ݃଴ else. To account for heavy censoring with known censoring points and 
heterogeneous giving behaviour, we implement a simple and well-behaved three-step 
estimation procedure according to Chernozhukov and Hong (2002). Their approach provides 
an easily computable and robust estimator. The first step is to estimate a probability model: 
 
 ߜ௜ ൌ ݌ݎሺX௜ᇱߛሻ ൅ ݑ௜ (8) 
 
to select a subset of observations with X௜ᇱߚሺߠሻ ൐ 0. ߜ௜ indicates not-censored observations. 
We use a probit model to estimate the probability of giving. To identify our subset ܬ଴, we 
include all observations where	݌ݎሺ݃௜∗ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ ݌ݎሺX௜ᇱߛොሻ ൐ 1 െ ߠ ൅ ܿ, where ܿ is a trimming 
constant between 0 and ߠ and accounts for the size of excluded observations. Chernozhukov 
and Hong (2002) propose to choose ܿ such that ݌ݎሺX௜ᇱߛොሻ ൐ 1 െ ߠ ൅ ܿ seems to be reasonable. 
We choose ܿ =10th quantile of all ݌ݎሺX௜ᇱߛොሻ. The second step is to derive the initial (inefficient) 
estimator ߚመ଴ሺߠሻ for ܬ଴ by running quantile regression (7), which only asymptotically selects 
those observations with covariates such that X௜ᇱߚመሺߠሻ ൐ 0. The third step ensures efficiency of 
our estimates. Efficient estimates ߚመଵሺߠሻ  can be derived by running quantile regression (7) for 
a redefined sample ܬଵ. It is the largest subset possible with observations such that X௜ᇱߚመሺߠሻ ൐
1 െ ߠ ൅ ܿ and X௜ᇱߚመ଴ሺߠሻ ൐ 0. Our final estimates are obtained as a solution to: 
 
 







3 Data and data processing 
All information generated in the process of taxation is documented in the tax unit’s income 
tax return. It contains all relevant information on the family situation, the declaration of 
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income from different sources, granted deductions and exemptions, calculation of taxable 
income and personal income tax payment.  
In each year of assessment, roughly 30 million tax units file income tax returns. For every 
third year, starting in 1992, the German Federal Statistical Office assembles the official 
income tax returns electronically as Income Tax Statistic. Available in form of scientific-use-
files are years 1998, 2001 and 2004, drawn as 10% stratified random samples from all filed 
income tax returns in the respective assessment year.4 Hence, scientific-use-files contain 
about 3 million tax units per year stripped of identifying information. The three scientific-use-
files form our database. In the course of stripping the data of identifying information, 
knowledge is limited to some tax units with high gross income. Therefore, these cases are 
excluded from our database. Our analysis considers only cases with a positive taxable income 
and complete information regarding socio-demographic variables. 
The German Tax Code contains a blanket allowance for personal expenses. For every tax unit, 
we identify whether deductions are itemised or are below the blanket allowance. Tax units 
that do not itemise, are assigned a tax-defined price of giving of 1 €. For non-itemizers, there 
is no fiscal incentive to give.  We must also account for another subpopulation of tax units. 
The subpopulation of borderline itemizers is excluded from our sample. Borderline itemizers 
are tax units who exceed their blanket allowance just because of their charitable contributions. 
Then, charitable contributions can be at least partially deducted from taxable income. 
However, calculating݌௜, based on డ்ሺ௫೔ሻడ௫೔  for the first Euro given, leads to ݌௜ = 1 for borderline 
itemizers. ݌௜ = 1 implies that there is no fiscal incentive to give at all. Thus, ݌௜ = 1 is no valid 
measure of tax incentives for borderline itemizers. In order to avoid distorted price 
elasticities, borderline itemizers are not included in our sample.  
When interpreting 1 െ ப୘ሺ୶౟ሻப୶౟  as a measure for tax-defined prices of giving, a brief discussion 
about endogeneity is needed. Endogeneity arises when marginal tax rates are used to analyse 
human behaviour. Tax units are able to influence their marginal tax rate through economic 
activity (Triest 1998). Tax deductibility of charitable contributions affects taxable income and 
thus the marginal tax rate. Hence, ݌௜ is determined by tax units, at least to a certain extent. 
The more an individual gives, the lower డ்ሺ௫೔ሻడ௫೔  will be. However, if economic theory holds, 
high tax-defined prices of giving lead to small contributions. To avoid డ்ሺ௫೔ሻడ௫೔  varying with the 
                                                 
4 The stratification cells are chosen according to gross taxable income and other tax-relevant characteristics. The 
procedure aims at minimising the standard error with respect to taxable income. The sample includes all tax units 
with high incomes or high income losses.  
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amount given, డ்ሺ௫೔ሻడ௫೔  is applied for the first (marginal) unit of charitable contribution. Hence, 
݃௜ is added to ݔ௜.5 
All in all, our final samples contain 967,631 tax units for 1998, 1,050,292 for 2001 and 
835,897 for 2004. To complete our dataset, assessment years 1998, 2001 and 2004 are pooled, 
leaving us with 2,853,820 income tax records. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each 
wave and the pooled sample. The share of donors is given for single assessment cases, joint 
assessment cases and overall cases of each sample.6 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In order to calculate the tax-defined price of giving, it is necessary to account for some special 
treatments favouring certain tax units and kinds of income. The German Income Tax Code 
exempts several types of earnings, e.g. unemployment benefits or foreign income, from 
regular taxation. Although these earnings are not included in the tax base, they have an impact 
on average and marginal tax rates, which are applied to the tax base. On the basis of these 
earnings and the regular tax base, a fictitious tax rate will be calculated. This tax rate is then 
applied to the actual tax base of a tax unit. 
Furthermore, German married couples benefit from a special taxation treatment, the splitting 
tax schedule. If taxable income is unevenly divided between the two spouses, married couples 
who opt for joint assessment can reduce their marginal tax rate. Hence, joint assessment 
favours married couples by reducing the income tax liability in comparison to single 
taxpayers or unmarried couples with an identical household income but different individual 
taxable income. In order to compute reliable tax prices of giving, all special treatments have 
to be accounted for. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 depicts German tax-defined prices of giving for 1998, 2001 and 2004 as function of 
taxable income ݔ௜ separately for the tax schedule according to single and joint assessment. All 
values reported are in real terms to the base of 2004. The tax-defined price of giving ݌௜ is 
equal to 1 for taxable incomes below the basic tax-free allowance. Due to lower marginal tax 
rates, ݌௜ is higher for joint assessed tax units than for basic tax schedule cases. Progressive 
marginal tax rates lead to different net costs for two identical tax units, only varying in their 
                                                 
5 It is also possible to apply marginal tax rates for the last marginal unit. However, these marginal tax rates can 
be easier manipulated by tax units. Therefore, our estimates are based on marginal tax rates for the first unit of 
charitable contributions.    
6 Detailed descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix A1.  
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taxable income. The net cost of charitable contribution will be lowered by high marginal tax 
rates. Taxpayers with higher incomes (and higher marginal tax rates) will benefit from higher 
tax savings and thus from smaller prices. The lowest tax price of giving applies for taxable 
incomes above € 54,998 (݌௜ = 0.47) in 1998, € 61,375 (݌௜ = 0.515) in 2001 and € 52,152 (݌௜ = 
0.55) in 2004.  
To analyse the impact of the tax unit’s income on the giving behaviour, it is useful to 
construct an income concept which is a better proxy for the actual consumption possibilities 
than the (tax code based) income aggregates provided in the data. Due to various tax reliefs 
and different tax exemptions, income aggregates conceal the actual spending power of a tax 
unit. Hence, we construct an adjusted gross income. The underlying data contains detailed 
information to adjust taxable income for tax reliefs, allowances, specific depreciations, 
several tax free earnings and just tax motivated losses. Similarly to the approaches from Bach 
et al. (2009), we derive an adjusted gross income (ݕ௜) from the information contained in the 
income tax statements.7 
To capture the influence of governmental welfare expenditures on charitable giving, we use 
data on federal state and municipal welfare spending, including expenditures for education 
and science, cultural affairs, social family and youth transfers, governmental transfers for 
impacts of war or political occurrences, health care, sports and environmental expenditures. 
Information is available for 1998, 2001 and 2004. ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ denotes the net governmental welfare 
spending per capita for each federal state and is also adjusted for inflation. ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ is assigned to 
every tax unit ݅ in federal state ݆. The ratio can be interpreted as public-sector charity per 
capita and serves as comprehensive and appropriate substitute for the wide range of public 
goods to which taxpayers donate. Table 3 depicts federal state welfare expenditures per capita 
for all three years. 
 




All results presented in this section are based on the pooled sample, which is comprised of 
almost three million tax units.8 Figure 2 graphically summarizes the main results of our 
empirical model: the quantile coefficient estimates for price, income and governmental 
expenditures. Lower and upper confidence intervals are indicated by a grey shaded area. Due 
                                                 
7 Further information on the adjusted gross income construction is provided in Appendix A2. 
8 Respective cross-section results for each single wave are consistent with regard to the magnitude of the 
estimates for the pooled sample and provided in the supplementing materials. 
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to heavy left censoring, estimation starts with coefficients for the 0.46th quantile.9 All 
estimates for price and income are significant at the 1% level of confidence. The shape of the 
quantile functions supports the non-parametric regression approach and rejects the assumption 
of constant price and income elasticities for different amounts of giving. There is a positive 
but no monotonic relationship between income and giving. The income effect is positive for 
all quantiles. However, lower contributors are more income elastic than higher contributors. 
This result is consistent with a more pronounced income effect for tax units with low adjusted 
gross income.10 Hence, income elastic tax units are eager to donate even more relative to an 
increase in income. From the 0.95th quantile on, income elasticity is smaller than 1, qualifying 
high giving tax units as income inelastic. We observe that tax units do not enhance their 
amount given to charity in proportion to their increased adjusted gross income, indicating a 
decreasing marginal utility of giving. Therefore, the assumption that charitable giving is a 
normal good holds true for the entire population of donors. However, our results also imply 
that tax units take their absolute amount given to charity into account rather than the amount 
relative to their income. It can be assumed that tax units have an individual upper threshold 
when deciding about their amount given. The gap between the actual amount given and upper 
threshold may differ for high and low contributors. For low contributors, the scope appears to 
be bigger until reaching their individual threshold. Therefore, tax units with small 
contributions are more elastic than tax units with high contributions. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Regarding the tax-defined price of giving, our findings are in line with the theoretical 
framework since the relationship is negative. Again, the quantile function is non-monotonic. 
We are able to identify three different groups of contributors: (1) price elastic tax units with 
low contributions (46th  to 50th quantile), (2) price inelastic tax units with medium to higher 
contributions (55th to 95th) and (3) price elastic tax units with the highest contributions (99th 
quantile). For the first group, our point estimate for tax price elasticity amounts to ߚመ଴.ସ଺௣  = 
1.439 within a confidence interval between -1.469 and -1.409. For the 46th conditional 
quantile of the distribution, a 1% increase in the tax price of giving reduces the amount given 
to charity by 1.439%. If the tax price of giving increases, they will reduce their contributions 
disproportionately. Regarding the bulk of tax units (medium and higher contributions), we 
observe that giving is far from being price elastic. The point estimates range from -0.786 to -
0.449. We consider these tax units to be ordinary contributors. In this range our findings 
indicate that giving is not primarily driven by tax incentives but rather by altruistic motives. 
                                                 
9 See Appendix A3 for detailed estimation results. 
10 The Pearson correlation coefficient between charitable giving and adjusted gross income amounts to 0.40.  
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For this group, varying the tax price of giving will only slightly affect its decision as to how 
much money is given to charity. 
For the highest contributors (0.99th quantile), we have identified a price elastic behaviour. Our 
point estimate amounts to ߚመ଴.ଽଽ௣  = -1.140. Here, the decision to donate is highly sensitive to tax 
incentives and appears to be a strategy for tax planning (minimising personal income tax). 
Using donations as an instrument to shift their tax base, these tax units will strongly react to 
variations of tax incentives. 
Our last main results concerns crowding out. Our findings support the hypothesis that public 
sector charity crowds out private philanthropy at every level of giving. However, crowding 
out is not constant but varies with the level of individual giving. The quantile function is 
monotonically decreasing in absolute value. Lower quantiles react to governmental social 
transfers much stronger than upper quantiles. From the 46th to the 70th, we observe a more 
than complete crowding out of charitable giving with estimates ranging from ߚመ଴.ସ଺ீ  = -1.359 to 
ߚመ଴.଻଴ீ  = -1.151. These findings indicate that tax units with scarce resources are very well aware 
of government funding and withdraw the respective resources. Incomplete crowding out is 
observed for higher/highest contributions (75th to 99th quantiles), ranging from ߚመ଴.଻ହீ  = -0.995 
to ߚመ଴.ଽଽீ  = -0.138. For the highest contributors, a 1% increase in governmental funding 
diminishes private contributions by 0.138%, which indicates that their donations are almost 
unaffected by public sector expenditure. It appears that the highest contributors are driven by 
warm glow or are not aware of government funding. In sum, crowding out estimates are quite 
stable over time but heterogeneous within a year. We find that the magnitude depends on the 
amount of giving. Although we find strong evidence that government welfare expenditure 
crowds out private philanthropy, we must be cautious about our findings. Our findings 
indicate that public-sector charitable giving attenuates private philanthropy, causality is not 
guaranteed. It could be argued that lowered private charitable giving may result in increased 
government expenditure (Abrams and Schmitz 1978). 
To evaluate the overall effectiveness of tax incentives in the presence of crowding out, we 
have to combine the crowding out and price elasticity according to equation (4). For the 
overall efficiency of tax treatment, we can state that the combination of tax price elasticity 
and crowding out leads to an elastic behaviour for all considered quantiles and; therefore, tax 
incentives are efficient.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
All in all, our main results lead in some aspects to different conclusions regarding previous 
studies. This is attributed to the estimation strategy applied. For instance, our findings 
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challenge the overall effectiveness of tax incentives to boost giving if only price elasticity is 
considered. Our results imply that the majority of donators is not price elastic. This challenges 
former findings of price elastic behaviour for the US11 and Germany.12 Based on OLS or 
Tobit regression models, these studies estimate average price elasticities. Since quantile 
regression aims at determining the relation between the price and giving at different points in 
the conditional distribution, quantile regression estimates are not directly comparable with 
these results. Our results support more recent findings by Bakija and Heim (forthcoming) and 
Fack and Landaise (2010), whose estimates are in the lower range of former results. 
Moreover, our results indicate that giving is heterogeneous among taxpayers and confirm 
findings for the French case. It is possible that part of the differences between our estimates 
and former findings result from different samples of the underlying income distribution. Our 
sample contains more tax units with middle and upper-middle income, whereas US studies are 
based on richer tax units, which react more to tax incentives.   
The bulk of empirical studies on the crowding out effect find a negative connection between 
private charitable giving and public sector expenditure.13 Our findings divide the giving 
population into pure and impure altruists or tax units which are aware of government funding. 
Our estimation approach allows us to estimate the impact of government expenditure on 
giving behaviour across the underlying population. According to Andreoni’s (1990) impure 
altruism approach, we find that small and lower medium donors are pure altruists (complete 
crowding out effect), whereas upper medium and higher contributors are impure altruists. The 
latter derive utility both from their individual contribution and from the overall level of 
giving. In addition to the impure altruism approach, our finding of a partial crowding out 
effect can either be result from fiscal illusion or an endorsement effect (Eckel et al. 2005).  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
To complete the picture, we provide estimates for the socio-demographic control variables in 
Figure 4. Giving to charity strongly depends on age. Younger tax units give ceteris paribus 
less, older tax units give more. Children, church membership and marriage mainly have a 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Schwartz (1970), Feldstein (1975), Feldstein and Taylor (1976), Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), 
Boskin and Feldstein (1977), Clotfelter (1980), Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981), Barrett (1991), Randolph (1995), 
as well as Reece (1979) and Auten et al. (2002). 
12 Paqué (1986) deploys time-series data for the period from 1961 to 1980. Analysing 55 observations, Paqué 
quantifies giving as price and income elastic. Deploying a sample of German income tax return data for 1998 
and using Tobit regression model, von Auer and Kalusche (2007) find that giving behaviour in Germany is price 
elastic but not income elastic. 
13 Clotfelter (1985) reports an average crowding out of only about 5%. Kingma (1989) finds crowding out of 
13.5%. Khanna and Sandler (2000) prove evidence for crowding in between 13% and 89%. Ribar and Wilhelm 
(2002) find that crowding out is not significantly different from zero. Andreoni and Payne (2009) indicate two 
crowding out effects. Distinguishing between the classic crowding out of donors and the crowding out of fund 
raising by government grants, they find that crowding out is primarily due to reduced fund-raising and ranges 
from 70% to 100%, whereas classic crowding out amounts to only 30%. 
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positive effect on giving behaviour. Tax units whose income is predominantly based on 
employment income donate less than tax units that mainly derive other types of income. The 
year dummies or 1998 and 2001 are of comparable magnitude for all quantiles and negative, 
this may point to the income effect exceeding the price effect of changes in tax schedule (see 
Figure 1). Furthermore, the functions are monotonically decreasing in the absolute value of 
donations and indicate an economically small but significant difference in giving behaviour 




We have examined a rich body of income tax return data on philanthropic activity. Our 
estimations refer to a representative sample of German taxpayers. Contrary to the vast 
majority of empirical studies but similar to more current approaches, e.g. Fack and Landaise 
(2010), we assume non-constant price and income elasticities. Censored quantile regression is 
eligible to deal with heavy-censoring and allows for heterogeneity in giving behaviour. Our 
findings challenge the view that the tax deductibility of charitable contributions is overall 
treasury efficient unless crowding out is taken into account. If there are to be any fiscal 
incentives, they are appropriate to activate tax units who have not given yet. Furthermore, tax 
units with very generous donations are highly responsive to tax incentives due to low prices 
of giving. From a public-finance point of view, our results imply that there should be a 
differentiation between ‘good’ (price elastic) and ‘bad’ (price inelastic) tax units to allocate 
tax incentives more effectively. Although our findings qualify tax reliefs for charitable giving 
as ineffective for the majority of tax units, they do not necessarily imply that tax incentives 
are useless and should be abolished. In particular, if crowding is taken into account our results 
confirm the treasury efficiency of the current tax treatment. Furthermore, there may be several 
more reasons to justify the current system.  
From a political perspective, existing tax incentives for charitable giving set a clear signal for 
codetermination. Taxpayers are required to reveal their preferences and decide on their own 
scarce resources for financing desired public goods. Furthermore, it is possible that the 
elimination of tax incentives will cause considerable public and political pressure. Lobbyists 
of charity groups will insist on maintaining tax reliefs for charitable giving and highlight their 
positive external effects on social well-being. Moreover, they may argue that removing tax 
incentives for charitable giving will be seen as a harsh blow against private philanthropy and 
codetermination.  
Assuming that public goods can be provided at different public and private opportunity costs, 
it might be reasonable to foster private philanthropy through tax incentives. The greater the 
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comparative advantage of private provision, the better the case for granting tax reliefs for 
charitable giving. Private charity organisations must be competitive and transparent to acquire 
new funds. Due to lean structures and competitive markets, private provision appears to be 
more effective than public provision. Hence, forgone tax revenues resulting from tax reliefs 
might be smaller than wasted tax revenues resulting from ineffective public provision. 
Overall, our empirical results must be interpreted with caution. Although the data contains 
detailed information of German taxpayers and is a convenient source for tax policy research, 
the age of the data may hamper the analysis of today’s charitable giving behaviour. 
Furthermore, our analysis is constrained to cross-section data and a pooled sample. There is a 
wide variety of panel data methods to investigate tax policy over time. Recent US studies (e.g. 
Bakija and Heim forthcoming) present new and lower estimations for tax panel data. A 
German taxpayer panel as well as matching the current data with panel data would be 
powerful sources to carry out further tax policy research and provide valuable insights into tax 
incentives in general. 
Our study uses an established approach to evaluate the effectiveness of current German tax 
incentives for different points of the conditional distribution of charitable giving. The current 
deductibility of charitable contributions from taxable income distinguishes between taxpayers 
with low and high marginal tax rates. There are various suggestions on how to reform the 
current method. Theoretical (Saez 2004) as well as experimental research (Eckel and 
Grossman 2003) provide interesting results on how tax treatment of charitable giving can be 
improved. Furthermore, we believe that less aggregative data would be helpful to boost 
further research. The highly aggregative data may conceal substantially both different tax 
price elasticities and different crowding out effects for particular types of charitable 
contributions. Garrett and Rhine (2009) were the first to analyse different categories of 
charitable giving and government spending. Therefore, further research would give valuable 
insights on if and how different types of charitable contributions react to tax deductibility and 
public-sector expenditure. The government could take more specific and effective action to 
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Figure 1. Tax prices of giving in 1998, 2001, 2004 
 
Note: Price of giving according to German Income Tax Code. Due to the income tax arrangement for married 


















0 25000 50000 75000 100000 125000
taxable income in euro (inflation adjusted)
Singles 2004 Couples 2004
Singles 2001 Couples 2001
Singles 1998 Couples 1998
 20
Figure 2. Estimates for income, price and social governmental expenditures, pooled data
 



























































Figure 4. Estimates for socio-demographic factors, pooled data 
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Table 1. Dependent variable and covariates 
 
Variable  Description Coding/ Construction 
௜݃  charitable giving plus 1 Euro Log of charitable giving 
ݕ௜  aggregated gross income Log of aggregated gross income 
݌௜  tax defined price of giving Log  of tax defined price of givng 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩  Governmental spending Log of per capita social transfers to income ratio in Federal State j. 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊  Children Dummy variable (1 = children; 0 = else). 
݀_ܽ݃݁   age cohort (in years: 0-29;30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60-69; 70 and above) 
Dummy variables ( 1= age cohort  applies; 0 = else), 
reference category: 40 – 49. 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀  church membership Dummy variable (1 = church member; 0 = else). 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ  married/ joint assessment Dummy variable (1 = married; 0 = else). 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ  mainly income from  employment Dummy variable (1 = status applies; 0 = else). 
݀_ݕ݁ܽݎ  assessment year Dummy variable (1 = 2001; 0 = 1998). 
 
 
Table 2. Share of donors 










t 2004 287,400 42% 
2001 388,539 40% 
1998 409,478 38% 









2004 548,497 66% 
2001 661,753 64% 
1998 558,153 61% 
Pooled Sample 1,768,403 64% 
A
ll 
2004 835,897 58% 
2001 1,050,292 55% 
1998 967,631 51% 





Table 3. Governmental expenditures per capita 
 
Federal state 1998 2001 2004 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 2,904.82 2,974.46 2,919.23 
Bavaria 2,982.00 2,990.52 2,979.11 
Berlin 4,713.93 4,617.36 4,251.16 
Brandenburg 3,022.20 2,823.76 2,761.17 
Bremen 4,362.06 4,358.18 4,180.55 
Hamburg 4,263.31 4,169.54 4,123.95 
Hesse 3,286.82 3,310.90 3,322.88 
Lower Saxony 2,937.04 3,042.81 2,925.33 
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 3,380.94 3,281.35 3,213.26 
Northrhine-Westphalia 3,126.64 3,173.78 3,210.71 
Rhineland Palatinate 2,821.95 2,814.56 2,711.58 
Saarland 2,825.63 2,847.14 2,810.59 
Saxony 3,007.40 2,861.57 2,797.92 
Saxony-Anhalt 3,504.08 3,349.74 3,424.19 
Schleswig Holstein 3,096.98 3,006.07 2,925.72 
Thuringia 2,732.07 3,150.56 3,076.07 
Note: All monetary values in EUR and inflation-adjusted. 
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Appendix 
A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1. Charitable giving by tax unit type 














2004 170 403 
2001 148 367 
1998 116 306 
Standard 
deviation 
2004 735 1091 
2001 667 1,012 
1998 467 720 
Median 
contribution
2004 0 111 
2001 0 107 











2004 353 533 
2001 321 502 
1998 276 454 
Standard 
deviation 
2004 964 1144 
2001 929 1,123 
1998 757 927 
Median 
contribution
2004 82 198 
2001 63 160 
1998 54 140 
Note: All monetary values in EUR and inflation-adjusted. 
 
 
Table A2. Charitable Giving by age 












2004 18.5% 35.2% 43.9% 48.5% 56.1% 62.4% 
2001 19.5% 32.4% 41.2% 49.2% 57.5% 64.7% 
1998 20.6% 30.7% 38.9% 47.3% 54.6% 63.0% 
Mean 
contribution 
2004 28 101 170 216 266 334 
2001 28 83 135 201 265 359 
1998 28 67 111 166 198 279 
Mean income 
2004 17,134 39,282 49,577 50,645 42,634 39,276 
2001 19,371 36,578 43,672 48,135 44,079 44,395 











2004 32.6% 57.2% 66.0% 68.7% 69.1% 75.2% 
2001 35.0% 52.7% 63.1% 67.4% 71.2% 77.0% 
1998 33.7% 50.0% 60.1% 64.7% 67.3% 75.3% 
Mean 
contribution 
2004 89 231 317 354 441 678 
2001 96 200 289 338 437 640 
1998 83 173 258 304 340 495 
Mean income 
2004 47,264 82,015 87,849 89,751 77,539 73,985 
2001 49,046 77,978 85,607 84,733 76,631 78,077 
1998 41,694 67,367 77,056 76,393 67,361 69,380 
Note: All monetary values in EUR and inflation-adjusted. 
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Table A3.  Charitable Giving by Federal State in 2001 







2004 64.2% 371 1073 77,507 
2001 61.2% 331 1,093 74,208 
1998 56.1% 269 773 62,447 
Bavaria 
2004 69.6% 354 969 78,015 
2001 67.7% 318 904 72,234 
1998 63.9% 267 728 59,847 
Berlin 
2004 47.1% 239 803 59,296 
2001 43.5% 207 717 58,716 
1998 40.3% 168 598 50,265 
Brandenburg 
2004 37.7% 147 567 52,166 
2001 35.9% 135 543 52,085 
1998 31.2% 108 451 46,446 
Bremen 
2004 43.7% 177 615 45,898 
2001 42.3% 173 606 48,369 
1998 39.8% 142 480 42,870 
Hamburg 
2004 49.8% 268 990 65,404 
2001 45.9% 229 870 60,418 
1998 43.4% 189 650 53,221 
Hesse 
2004 59.2% 315 977 70,859 
2001 55.8% 274 883 67,601 
1998 52.4% 227 702 56,683 
Lower Saxony 
2004 56.4% 249 780 65,075 
2001 52.3% 215 736 60,754 




2004 35.6% 135 497 48,362 
2001 35.9% 130 499 49,771 
1998 34.0% 106 409 45,791 
Northrhine-
Westphalia 
2004 58.4% 177 615 45,890 
2001 53.5% 294 929 74,989 
1998 48.2% 248 758 63,683 
Rhineland 
Palatinate 
2004 55.6% 245 756 62,138 
2001 52.3% 217 679 60,963 
1998 49.0% 180 564 50,627 
Saarland 
2004 84.0% 209 591 49,287 
2001 85.7% 195 496 48,337 
1998 85.3% 176 407 41,272 
Saxony 
2004 46.5% 199 700 52,749 
2001 46.2% 178 646 51,545 
1998 43.9% 139 483 46,416 
Saxony-Anhalt 
2004 38.4% 136 495 49,862 
2001 36.4% 123 454 51,520 
1998 35.2% 111 414 45,233 
Schleswig 
Holstein 
2004 48.7% 218 771 62,800 
2001 49.7% 190 665 59,372 
1998 51.5% 159 528 52,301 
Thuringia 
2004 40.0% 140 494 47,434 
2001 42.5% 137 470 47,716 
1998 40.1% 115 430 46,978 
Germany 
2004 57.9% 290 896 69,214 
2001 55.1% 256 846 65,805 
1998 51.2% 209 655 55,374 
Note: All monetary values in EUR and inflation-adjusted. 
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Table A4. Charitable Giving by tax unit size 












2004 41.5% 40.8% 47.6% 52.9% 54.3% 
2001 40.9% 37.3% 40.5% 43.9% 43.6% 
1998 38.8% 35.2% 37.1% 38.6% 40.3% 
Mean 
contribution 
2004 169 146 194 265 253 
2001 163 107 130 171 184 
1998 126 88 101 132 149 
Mean Income
2004 36,342 45,608 56,583 62,726 66,808 
2001 37,600 37,379 42,094 46,790 47,347 











2004 64.1% 63.3% 68.9% 73.3% 73.4% 
2001 63.5% 59.7% 65.9% 70.5% 71.5% 
1998 60.9% 57.4% 62.3% 66.9% 68.3% 
Mean 
contribution 
2004 362 293 332 459 617 
2001 333 255 306 431 597 
1998 276 228 278 389 530 
Mean income
2004 77,737 86,663 89,613 95,087 96,764 
2001 78,815 77,332 86,932 91,817 92,051 
1998 69,660 69,173 77,565 81,043 82,588 
Note: All monetary values in EUR and inflation-adjusted. 
 
 
Table A5. Charitable Giving by church membership 















2004 37.6% 167 767 44,899 
2001 35.4% 145 700 42,552 
1998 33.2% 115 503 37,387 
No church 
2004 43.7% 171 723 37,696 
2001 41.7% 148 655 37,175 










2004 52.5% 349 1196 78,616 
2001 51.7% 328 1,113 77,523 
1998 47.9% 274 888 70,459 
No church 
2004 68.7% 354 915 85,860 
2001 65.9% 320 896 82,580 
1998 62.8% 278 735 72,769 
Note: All monetary values in EUR and inflation-adjusted. 
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A2: Adjusted Gross Income 
Table 6 presents the adjustments made to derive the Adjusted Gross Income. Bach et al. 
(2009) give more detailed information about adjusted gross income. At some points, our 
calculations differ from their approach.  
 
Table A6. Adjusted gross income 
Income from business activity 
(including income from agriculture and forestry, from unincorporated 
business enterprise and from self-employed activities) 
+ wage income, income from renting and leasing and other income 
+ earnings from capital investments (imputation of missing data on an average level) 
+ all tax reliefs and tax allowances for income from business activity as far as identifiable 
+ allowable expenses for wage and other income (consumptive character)  
+ age relief 
+ tax-exempted income from foreign countries 
+ loan and income indemnification 
+ life annuity income less income component (flat 70% of life annuity income) 
+ tax shelters: losses from equity holdings 
+ losses from business activity income and renting and leasing income, if the modified income class and the 
sum of income until this point is still negative (negative consumption is not possible) 
- fixed income tax and solidarity surcharge 
- alimony / child support 
+ child benefit 
= Adjusted Gross Income 
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A3: Estimation results 
 
Table A7. Quantile regression estimates pooled sample, 46th -70th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 46th 50th 55th 60th 65th 70th 
ݕ௜ 1.164*** 1.333*** 1.456*** 1.488*** 1.430*** 1.345*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.004) 
݌௜ -1.439*** -1.203*** -0.786*** -0.587*** -0.565*** -0.532*** 
 (-0.015) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.013) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -1.359*** -1.325*** -1.219*** -1.218*** -1.251*** -1.151*** 
 (-0.015) (-0.014) (-0.015) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -0.122*** -0.413*** -0.587*** -0.835*** -1.144*** -1.475*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.462*** -0.491*** -0.536*** -0.558*** -0.533*** -0.469*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.004) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.494*** 0.444*** 0.411*** 0.388*** 0.357*** 0.316*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.004) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 1.046*** 1.005*** 0.958*** 0.908*** 0.834*** 0.752*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.855*** 1.786*** 1.685*** 1.564*** 1.425*** 1.268*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.302*** 0.261*** 0.223*** 0.190*** 0.168*** 0.153*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.003) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.564*** 0.480*** 0.434*** 0.343*** 0.229*** 0.106*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.004) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.706*** 0.694*** 0.613*** 0.580*** 0.560*** 0.501*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.669*** -0.625*** -0.606*** -0.588*** -0.559*** -0.518*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
݀_ݕ݁ܽݎଽ଼ -0.248*** -0.220*** -0.201*** -0.175*** -0.157*** -0.138*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) 
݀_ݕ݁ܽݎ଴ଵ -0.327*** -0.277*** -0.238*** -0.203*** -0.171*** -0.137*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ -0.313* -1.952*** -3.485*** -3.311*** -1.937*** -1.329*** 
 (-0.137) (-0.131) (-0.132) (-0.053) (-0.132) (-0.126) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 
(*), 99% (**) and 99.9 (***). 
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Table A8. Quantile regression estimates pooled sample, 75th -99th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 75th 80th 85th 90th 95th 99th 
ݕ௜ 1.260*** 1.221*** 1.144*** 1.020*** 0.890*** 0.779*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.009) 
݌௜ -0.540*** -0.476*** -0.449*** -0.599*** -0.849*** -1.140*** 
 (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.015) (-0.024) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -0.995*** -0.869*** -0.680*** -0.510*** -0.342*** -0.138*** 
 (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.015) (-0.022) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -1.629*** -1.253*** -0.569*** -0.335*** -0.411*** -0.459*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.012) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.367*** -0.295*** -0.254*** -0.245*** -0.237*** -0.100*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.007) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.281*** 0.255*** 0.229*** 0.206*** 0.171*** 0.074*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.007) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 0.683*** 0.619*** 0.570*** 0.531*** 0.455*** 0.224*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.010) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.144*** 1.046*** 0.973*** 0.866*** 0.733*** 0.409*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.013) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.144*** 0.128*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.056*** 
 (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.006) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.014** -0.068*** -0.096*** -0.045*** 0.045*** 0.093*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.008) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.421*** 0.338*** 0.234*** 0.100*** -0.088*** -0.263*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.007) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.489*** -0.460*** -0.430*** -0.427*** -0.403*** -0.214*** 
 (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.006) 
݀_ݕ݁ܽݎଽ଼ -0.130*** -0.115*** -0.106*** -0.088*** -0.070*** -0.053*** 
 (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.006) 
݀_ݕ݁ܽݎ଴ଵ -0.117*** -0.095*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.085*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.006) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ -1.198*** -1.310*** -1.533*** -1.113*** -0.491*** 0.039 
 (-0.120) (-0.123) (-0.120) (-0.123) (-0.061) (-0.206) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 




Table S1. Quantile regression estimates for 1998, 49th -70th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 49th  50th 55th 60th 65th 70th 
ݕ௜ 1.104*** 1.148*** 1.298*** 1.349*** 1.326*** 1.263*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
݌௜ -1.262*** -1.186*** -0.876*** -0.632*** -0.562*** -0.546*** 
 (-0.022) (-0.021) (-0.022) (-0.023) (-0.024) (-0.023) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -1.276*** -1.278*** -1.291*** -1.302*** -1.425*** -1.448*** 
 (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.023) (-0.025) (-0.025) (-0.025) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -0.242*** -0.299*** -0.571*** -0.841*** -1.142*** -1.460*** 
 (-0.012) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.013) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.434*** -0.461*** -0.556*** -0.637*** -0.617*** -0.505*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.608*** 0.592*** 0.538*** 0.475*** 0.420*** 0.355*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 1.153*** 1.130*** 1.054*** 0.946*** 0.840*** 0.746*** 
 (-0.011) (-0.010) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.012) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.953*** 1.923*** 1.795*** 1.632*** 1.459*** 1.281*** 
 (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.015) (-0.014) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.250*** 0.231*** 0.221*** 0.202*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.605*** 0.594*** 0.542*** 0.473*** 0.346*** 0.195*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.585*** 0.586*** 0.579*** 0.572*** 0.575*** 0.522*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.008) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.757*** -0.749*** -0.722*** -0.698*** -0.657*** -0.594*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ -0.281 -0.607** -1.522*** -1.409*** 0.342 1.738*** 
 (-0.203) (-0.197) (-0.206) (-0.223) (-0.229) (-0.224) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 
(*), 99% (**) and 99.9 (***). 
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Table S2. Quantile regression estimates for 1998, 75th -99th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 75th 80th 85th 90th 95th 99th 
ݕ௜ 1.196*** 1.177*** 1.078*** 0.971*** 0.848*** 0.722*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.014) 
݌௜ -0.556*** -0.478*** -0.522*** -0.658*** -0.899*** -1.227*** 
 (-0.021) (-0.021) (-0.020) (-0.021) (-0.024) (-0.036) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -1.296*** -1.155*** -0.916*** -0.666*** -0.402*** -0.165*** 
 (-0.023) (-0.023) (-0.022) (-0.023) (-0.025) (-0.035) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -1.583*** -1.052*** -0.426*** -0.251*** -0.376*** -0.444*** 
 (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.020) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.366*** -0.280*** -0.240*** -0.232*** -0.225*** -0.099*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.013) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.315*** 0.288*** 0.259*** 0.226*** 0.215*** 0.084*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.013) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 0.670*** 0.606*** 0.565*** 0.508*** 0.443*** 0.209*** 
 (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.018) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.142*** 1.041*** 0.971*** 0.845*** 0.710*** 0.343*** 
 (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.015) (-0.022) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.185*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.133*** 0.136*** 0.068*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.010) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.071*** -0.036*** -0.064*** -0.010 0.097*** 0.139*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.014) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.446*** 0.360*** 0.236*** 0.095*** -0.092*** -0.256*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.013) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.555*** -0.516*** -0.486*** -0.477*** -0.444*** -0.222*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.011) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ 1.733*** 1.320*** 0.926*** 0.530* 0.316 0.714* 
 (-0.206) (-0.211) (-0.201) (-0.207) (-0.227) (-0.328) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 
(*), 99% (**) and 99.9 (***). 
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Table S3. Quantile regression estimates for 2001, 45th -70th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 45 th 50 th 55 th 60 th 65 th 70 th 
ݕ௜ 1.183*** 1.352*** 1.460*** 1.525*** 1.452*** 1.365*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.008) 
݌௜ -1.298*** -0.946*** -0.663*** -0.444*** -0.470*** -0.436*** 
 (-0.026) (-0.024) (-0.025) (-0.026) (-0.025) (-0.023) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -1.739*** -1.589*** -1.450*** -1.430*** -1.435*** -1.290*** 
 (-0.026) (-0.024) (-0.025) (-0.026) (-0.025) (-0.023) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -0.042** -0.306*** -0.528*** -0.814*** -1.102*** -1.471*** 
 (-0.015) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.013) (-0.012) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.516*** -0.536*** -0.568*** -0.584*** -0.563*** -0.494*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.581*** 0.507*** 0.465*** 0.422*** 0.394*** 0.351*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 1.145*** 1.045*** 0.997*** 0.925*** 0.864*** 0.778*** 
 (-0.011) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.011) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.929*** 1.801*** 1.710*** 1.566*** 1.445*** 1.288*** 
 (-0.014) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.013) (-0.013) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.326*** 0.252*** 0.226*** 0.185*** 0.175*** 0.157*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.006) (-0.006) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.528*** 0.510*** 0.450*** 0.325*** 0.213*** 0.091*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.774*** 0.682*** 0.604*** 0.569*** 0.543*** 0.483*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.677*** -0.638*** -0.618*** -0.589*** -0.562*** -0.523*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ 2.186*** -0.151 -1.825*** -2.102*** -0.804*** -0.512* 
 (-0.236) (-0.215) (-0.224) (-0.232) (-0.226) (-0.212) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 
(*), 99% (**) and 99.9 (***). 
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Table S4. Quantile regression estimates for 2001, 75th -99th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 75 th 80 th 85 th 90 th 95 th 99 th  
ݕ௜ 1.258*** 1.199*** 1.121*** 0.993*** 0.872*** 0.776*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.010) (-0.018) 
݌௜ -0.473*** -0.463*** -0.448*** -0.600*** -0.843*** -1.090*** 
 (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.021) (-0.023) (-0.028) (-0.045) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -1.108*** -0.954*** -0.734*** -0.529*** -0.372*** -0.119** 
 (-0.023) (-0.023) (-0.022) (-0.024) (-0.027) (-0.038) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -1.696*** -1.350*** -0.597*** -0.350*** -0.408*** -0.537*** 
 (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.022) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.399*** -0.319*** -0.281*** -0.266*** -0.252*** -0.103*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.009) (-0.012) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.310*** 0.280*** 0.252*** 0.223*** 0.172*** 0.068*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.009) (-0.012) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 0.702*** 0.643*** 0.591*** 0.559*** 0.475*** 0.232*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.010) (-0.011) (-0.016) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.163*** 1.074*** 1.001*** 0.912*** 0.762*** 0.420*** 
 (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.015) (-0.022) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.154*** 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.048*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.010) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.006 -0.063*** -0.083*** -0.024** 0.059*** 0.091*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.015) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.401*** 0.324*** 0.221*** 0.082*** -0.105*** -0.253*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.012) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.497*** -0.470*** -0.444*** -0.437*** -0.419*** -0.215*** 
 (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.010) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ -0.360 -0.497* -0.948*** -0.758*** -0.105 -0.111 
 (-0.206) (-0.206) (-0.197) (-0.217) (-0.248) (-0.362) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 




Table S5. Quantile regression estimates for 2004, 43th -70th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 43 th 45 th 50 th 55 th 60 th 65 th 70 th 
ݕ௜ 0.927*** 1.142*** 1.399*** 1.499*** 1.503*** 1.424*** 1.344*** 
 (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.008) 
݌௜ -2.437*** -2.007*** -1.436*** -1.124*** -1.005*** -0.952*** -0.898*** 
 (-0.034) (-0.032) (-0.031) (-0.029) (-0.030) (-0.029) (-0.027) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -1.150*** -1.047*** -0.903*** -0.813*** -0.753*** -0.648*** -0.543*** 
 (-0.034) (-0.032) (-0.030) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.028) (-0.027) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -0.078*** -0.282*** -0.475*** -0.639*** -0.844*** -1.127*** -1.410*** 
 (-0.018) (-0.017) (-0.016) (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.014) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.461*** -0.457*** -0.448*** -0.438*** -0.420*** -0.414*** -0.408*** 
 (-0.011) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.381*** 0.347*** 0.296*** 0.269*** 0.278*** 0.262*** 0.246*** 
 (-0.010) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 0.882*** 0.870*** 0.869*** 0.869*** 0.872*** 0.82*** 0.768*** 
 (-0.013) (-0.012) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.010) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.742*** 1.710*** 1.669*** 1.612*** 1.544*** 1.421*** 1.297*** 
 (-0.017) (-0.015) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.013) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.387*** 0.340*** 0.264*** 0.203*** 0.158*** 0.136*** 0.113*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ 0.722*** 0.586*** 0.421*** 0.328*** 0.226*** 0.138*** 0.049*** 
 (-0.010) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.008) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.809*** 0.822*** 0.724*** 0.642*** 0.610*** 0.559*** 0.508*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.650*** -0.585*** -0.529*** -0.508*** -0.490*** -0.471*** -0.452*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.006) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ -0.238 -2.986*** -6.128*** -7.315*** -7.372*** -6.867*** -6.361*** 
 (-0.301) (-0.279) (-0.265) (-0.255) (-0.257) (-0.249) (-0.240) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% (*), 99% 
(**) and 99.9 (***). 
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Table S6. Quantile regression estimates for 2004, 75th -99th quantile 
Covariate Quantile 
 75 th 80 th 85 th 90 th 95 th 99 th 
ݕ௜ 1.278*** 1.248*** 1.219*** 1.078*** 0.937*** 0.813*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.010) (-0.018) 
݌௜ -0.797*** -0.648*** -0.454*** -0.604*** -0.881*** -1.225*** 
 (-0.026) (-0.025) (-0.025) (-0.026) (-0.031) (-0.054) 
ܩ௜௝௚௢௩ -0.446*** -0.360*** -0.312*** -0.243*** -0.209*** -0.107* 
 (-0.026) (-0.026) (-0.026) (-0.027) (-0.031) (-0.047) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଴ିଶଽ -1.571*** -1.425*** -0.829*** -0.460*** -0.464*** -0.382*** 
 (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.016) (-0.026) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ଷ଴ିଷଽ -0.335*** -0.283*** -0.244*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.104*** 
 (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.010) (-0.016) 
݀_ܽ݃݁ହ଴ିହଽ 0.226*** 0.204*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.137*** 0.073*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.014) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଺଴ି଺ଽ 0.694*** 0.617*** 0.559*** 0.526*** 0.450*** 0.242*** 
 (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.012) (-0.019) 
݀_ܽ݃݁଻଴ା 1.172*** 1.050*** 0.963*** 0.863*** 0.750*** 0.479*** 
 (-0.013) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.016) (-0.025) 
݀_݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊ 0.096*** 0.074*** 0.061*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.012) 
݀_݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ -0.027*** -0.097*** -0.144*** -0.101*** -0.022* 0.043** 
 (-0.008) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.015) 
݀_݄ܿݑݎ݄ܿ 0.433*** 0.343*** 0.253*** 0.132*** -0.058*** -0.274*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.014) 
݀_݁݉݌݈݋ݕ -0.426*** -0.405*** -0.368*** -0.370*** -0.346*** -0.211*** 
 (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.008) (-0.012) 
_ܿ݋݊ݏ -5.923*** -5.764*** -5.289*** -3.901*** -2.078*** -0.592 
 (-0.231) (-0.228) (-0.227) (-0.235) (-0.274) (-0.426) 
Note: Standard errors of coefficient estimates in brackets. Asterisks denote the respective significant level at 95% 




Figure S1. Quantile coefficient estimates for 1998 
 

































Figure S2. Quantile coefficient estimates for 2001 
 





































Figure S3. Quantile coefficient estimates for 2004 
 






































Figure S4. Estimates for socio-demographic factors for 1998 
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Figure S5. Quantile estimates for socio-demographic factors for 2001 
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Figure S6. Quantile estimates for socio-demographic factors for 2004 
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